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ABSTRACT
Crowdfunding is a novel industry which facilitates the matching of consumers who want
new interesting products with entrepreneurs who need capital to produce those prod-
ucts. Consumers may pledge to a crowdfunding project, essentially preordering the
product, which allows entrepreneurs to obtain the minimum amount of capital neces-
sary for production while simultaneously measuring demand for the product. The bulk
of this dissertation explores how consumers behave when thinking about and pledging to
crowdfunding projects.
Chapter 1 illustrates several notable empirical results with novel data from Kick-
starter and Reddit. First, the number of new backers (consumers who pledge) per day
accelerates up to the point when a project hits its goal then drops down—replicating
previous findings in the literature with a different sample and more relaxed empirical
assumptions. Second, “advertising” (Reddit posts) about projects has a positive effect on
the number of new backers, and this effect is stronger when a project is close to or has
already met its goal. These effects are shown to be both statistically and economically
significant.
Chapter 2 proposes a dynamic theoretical model of consumer behavior in the context
of crowdfunding. The model implies an acceleration in new backers per day as a project’s
probability of success nears one, offering one explanation for the acceleration identified
in Chapter 2 and previous literature. In addition, the immediate effect of advertising on
the number of backers is generally larger when the probability of success is higher, but
there remains some ambiguity for probabilities close to one. The model relies on fairly
simple assumptions about the preferences of consumers, but is only solved numerically.
Chapter 3 deviates from crowdfunding to discuss a particular econometric methodol-
ogy, the synthetic control method (SCM). We highlight some data generating processes
where the SCM could perform differently across units. However, we show inference
based on the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) ratio is not substantially distorted.
Additionally, we offer a word of warning about including all pretreatment outcomes as
economic predictors in the selection of synthetic weights. Doing so could complicate
inference based on the post/pretreatment MSPE ratio.
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CHAPTER 1
An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Behavior and
Advertising in Crowdfunding Markets
1.1 Introduction
A common problem faced by many entrepreneurs and small businesses is raising the capital nec-
essary to launch a new product. The high risk nature of the endeavor means both debt and equity
financing is expensive, if available at all. One solution has been offered by the relatively novel
industry of crowdfunding. Crowdfunding firms provide a platform for entrepreneurs to advertise
their project to consumers who “pledge” money to the project—called backers. If a predetermined
goal is met within a time frame set by the entrepreneur, then he or she receives the full pledged
amount. In return, backers are given a good after production takes place, equity in the firm, or
nothing at all in the case of pure charitable projects. If the goal is not met, backers are refunded
the pledged amount.1
While the economics of each type certainly overlap, this paper is primarily concerned with
reward-based crowdfunding—where consumers are essentially pre-ordering a product and bearing
the risk of production delays or failure. In the United States prior to May 2016, backers of equity-
based crowdfunding projects were restricted to accredited investors by the SEC.2 Reward-based
crowdfunding is not subject to this restriction or securities-related advertising regulations. The
most notable reward-based crowdfunding platforms are Kickstarter and Indiegogo. One example
of an equity crowdfunding platform is Crowdfunder. Crowdfunding sites for purely charitable
causes include Razoo and CrowdRise.
The budding industry of crowdfunding has continued to show strong growth in recent years.
Kickstarter, the largest reward-based crowdfunding platform, has received pledges of $2.65 billion
1Some crowdfunding platforms do allow partial funding but are not the subject of this paper.
2Technically, this applies to the offering of any financial security, not just equity. There are still rules governing
issuance, advertising, resale, and investment amounts. For an overview of current rules, see “Regulation Crowdfund-
ing: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers” at https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-
051316.htm
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since its inception in 2009. $2.3 billion was pledged to over 110 thousand successful projects.3
Given this growth and the recent relaxation of equity-based restrictions, crowdfunding will play an
increasingly important role in the promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation.
Given the novelty of crowdfunding, the economics literature has been primarily exploratory in
nature. Empirical results by Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017), Mollick (2014), and others demon-
strate the consumer behavior we study in this paper. In particular, Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017)
find significant concentrations of pledges at the beginning and end of a project’s funding cycle,
which we replicate in our empirical analysis. Concentration at the end of the cycle can simply be
explained by some consumers discounting and pushing back the cost of pledging. Concentration
at the beginning is likely due to friends, family, and/or fervent supporters of the project who knew
about it ahead of time. Additionally, Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) find the number of new back-
ers on a particular day is increasing in the cumulative progress (percentage of goal pledged) of the
previous day, and they find a positive effect of Twitter mentions on the number of new backers.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we partially replicate results from Kup-
puswamy and Bayus (2017) with a different dataset and relax a key methodological assump-
tion. Second, we further explore the empirical effect of social media advertising on crowdfunding
projects with data from Reddit; we interact our measure of advertising with the proportion of the
goal raised to show the marginal effect of advertising varies. Advertising appears to have a stronger
immediate effect when a project is close to or has exceeded its goal. However, we must rely on
lags of advertising to identify these effects because we do not exogenously control the timing of
advertising. Therefore, we caution against a causal interpretation.
1.2 Literature Review
Agrawal et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive overview of the economic issues and literature sur-
rounding the crowdfunding industry including entrepreneur (dis)incentives, backer (dis)incentives,
signaling effects, rules and regulations, and questions of social welfare. Agrawal et al. (2015) ana-
lyze investor behavior on Sellaband—an equity-based crowdfunding site for musicians—and find
investors are more likely to back a project as the cumulative funds raised increases, but the effect is
less pronounced for geographically local investors. Mollick (2014) describes some of the aspects
which determine the success of reward-based crowdfunding projects including measures of qual-
ity, geography, and the social network of the creator. He uses data from Kickstarter’s first three
years of operation, and collected data on delays of production which plague more than 75% of
successful projects. Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) also use Kickstarter data though from a later
time period to find backers are concentrated at the beginning and end of a project’s funding cycle,
3See https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats for current statistics.
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the number of new backers on a particular day is increasing in the project’s prior success, and the
number of new backers is positively affected by Twitter mentions. The empirical strategy in this
paper is similar to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) but allows previous values of the dependent
variable (the number of new backers for a given project-day) to affect current period independent
variables; whereas, Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) use a fixed effect Poisson approach.
In addition, Qiu (2013) uses data similar to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) and includes Twit-
ter mentions of projects—similar to our measure of “advertising” on Reddit. Qiu’s (2013) em-
pirical specification is different from ours but uses a similar dynamic panel GMM methodology.
Our model has the number of new backers per day as an outcome variable, while Qiu (2013) uses
the total number of backers as an outcome with a lagged outcome on the right-hand side as well.
We further discuss the empirical differences between this paper and Qiu (2013) in Section 1.3.3.
Li and Duan (2016) use a Bayesian hierarchical framework with a Poisson process determining
the number of consumers arriving each day and a hazard function determining the probability of
success, but unfortunately they have a more limited dataset than previous papers with only 577
projects. Both Qiu (2013) and Li and Duan (2016) find results similar to us: social media atten-
tion/advertising has a positive effect on the number of new backers pledging to a project.
Fundraising for charitable public goods is similar to reward-based crowdfunding in that con-
sumers typically observe the progress of a project prior to donating, and we expect this observation
to affect the probability they will donate. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) use a field experiment to
show that people are more likely to donate when they are told the project is closer to its goal. The
magnitudes of the experiment were in line with typical crowdfunding projects—the goal amount
was $3,000 and the average donation amounts were between $10 and $45. The data in our paper
are not a randomized experiment; instead we observe a panel of projects over their lifetime.
Given the social aspects of Reddit, this paper can also be related to marketing literature which
discusses word-of-mouth type advertising. For example, Liu (2006) uses online user reviews of
movies to measure the effect of word-of-mouth on box office revenues. Interestingly, the valence
(positive/negative sentiment) of the reviews did not have a statistically significant effect on rev-
enues; the number of people talking about a film was far more important. In this paper, we do
observe the body of comments but unfortunately do not have a decent measure of sentiment.4
4The observed score of posts (positive minus negative votes) is bounded below by zero, and posts are ranked based
on score so low ranked posts are less visible. Additionally, Reddit may obfuscate the score of posts under certain
circumstances to prevent voting manipulation.
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1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Kickstarter
Since 2009, Kickstarter has successfully raised over $2 billion for more than 100 thousand projects.
Kickstarter itself receives 5% of the successful dollars raised; unsuccessful projects pay no fee.
Amazon payments also takes 3-5% of the final pledged amount for successful projects. Recall
consumers are completely refunded if a project is not successful.5
Figure 1.1 shows an example of a Kickstarter project page. A viewer of this page does not see
the full history of funding—only the current amount and days remaining. Further down the page,
creators provide a full explanation of the project and rewards. Most projects have several reward
tiers. For example, $45 may be the minimum amount to receive the item and $60 rewards a signed
version of the item. Unfortunately, we do not observe rewards tiers—only the aggregate dollars
pledged and number of backers at the daily level.
Data for 41,403 Kickstarter projects from August 2013 to November 2014 were scraped from
Kickspy.com, which itself scraped from Kickstarter and is now shut down. The success rate for
projects since inception is 36% but for our sample is 47%; this is probably because Kickstarter is
more mature by the time our sample begins. We observe the amount raised and number of backers
on a daily basis, as well as the goal, category, duration, and end date. Only projects in US dollars
are considered. Missing observations result from Kickspy having difficulty scraping Kickstarter
on that day for technical reasons; approximately 3.8% of project-days are missing.
In order to maintain consistent interpretation of coefficients in our regression specifications,
we use only projects with funding cycles of exactly 30 days—about half our sample. Projects with
missing observations, no backers, or a decrease in the number of backers at some point, are also
dropped. If Kickstarter was experiencing difficulty on days with many missing observations, then
there may have been fewer new backers on those days; however, we have no reason to believe
features of projects caused their missingness.
The number of remaining projects is 10,798.6 Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics of these
projects, and Figure 1.2 illustrates some histograms of various features at the project level.7 Very
few unsuccessful projects achieve more than 50% of their goal, and many successful projects
receive only slightly more than their goal. This result is consistent with previous literature as noted
in both Mollick (2014) and Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017).
5Technically, the consumer is never charged, but the payment processor may place an authorization hold on the
funds.
6Appendix A.1 provides comparable statistics and figures to this section with the full sample of projects.
7Except for “End date,” the final bin includes all larger values.
4
Figure 1.1: Example Kickstarter project page
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Table 1.1: Kickstarter projects descriptive statistics.
Variable Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev.
Duration (days) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 0.00
Goal ($) 1.00 6000.00 5000000.00 21210.31 106830.65
Goal if successful ($) 1.00 5000.00 1100000.00 11513.06 27044.58
Pledged ($) 1.00 1752.97 2410741.22 11524.91 56973.10
Pledged if successful ($) 1.00 6990.00 2410741.22 22204.56 80711.02
Prop of goal achieved 0.00 0.48 15804.00 4.99 216.77
Prop of goal achieved if suc 1.00 1.15 15804.00 10.39 314.76
Backers 1.00 28.00 22195.00 153.87 704.97
Backers if successful 1.00 95.00 22195.00 296.74 1000.12
1.3.2 Reddit
Reddit is a social media website where users submit links to other webpages (hereafter “posts”)
which are rated up or down and commented on by other users.8 Posts are sorted by default based
on score (upvotes minus downvotes) and time elapsed since posting (older posts are ranked lower).
Posts are categorized by subject into “subreddits;” by default the front page combines several
of the most popular subreddits. Figure 1.3 shows a snapshot of the Reddit front page. Reddit
displays banner advertisements which are not the subject of this paper. Although we use the term
“advertisement,” we refer specifically to posts which link directly to Kickstarter projects. Users
are effectively anonymous, so it is not possible to determine whether a link was submitted by a
project’s creator or not.
In 2013, Reddit averaged 48.5 million unique monthly visitors from the United States,9 and it
continues to rank as one of the most popular social media websites in the U.S. The data used for
this paper include substantially all public Reddit posts which link to the domain kickstarter.com
from August 2013 to November 2014.10 The posts for all of Reddit were scraped during 2015 by
Jason Baumgartner at pushshift.io and most were archived at that time—voting and commenting
were no longer possible. The dataset was then uploaded to Google BigQuery by Felipe Hoffa,
where we obtained posts linking to Kickstarter.11 Comments for these posts were scraped by the
author later in January 2016.
20.5% of Kickstarter projects have at least one Reddit post linking directly to the project page
(13.5% for unsuccessful projects). Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of the number of posts per
project. Most projects have very few posts, so we do not worry too much about creators spamming
8Users can also submit their own text, but this paper does not involve analysis of so-called self posts.
9https://redditblog.com/2013/12/31/top-posts-of-2013-stats-and-snoo-years-resolutions/
10We also include kck.st, which is Kickstater’s url shortening domain.
11The data are still publicly available at https://bigquery.cloud.google.com/table/fh-
bigquery:reddit posts.full corpus 201509
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Figure 1.2: Histograms of project features.
Reddit throughout the funding cycle. Many posts have no comments, but there is still enough
variation to measure the effect of the number of comments in our empirical specifications. Figure
1.5 illustrates the distribution of posts across a project’s funding cycle—both in time and proportion
of goal raised. Most posts occur during the first week and under 50% raised.
In an ideal world, we would have randomized the timing of posts within each project to identify
the effects of advertising.12 The type of advertising considered is clearly endogenous in the sense
that new backers to a project may go on Reddit to make a post soon after pledging or having
decided to pledge. Therefore, an empirical specification including current period posts may be
measuring this reverse effect. To mitigate this problem, we use lags of advertising to identify
the effects of interest. However, there may still be other unobserved events which cause both an
increase in new backers and the likelihood of a Reddit post. For example, suppose a project receives
traditional media attention on day 1 which increases the number of new backers immediately and
in subsequent days, 2-4. If the immediate increase in backers induces a Reddit post on day 1, we
may attribute the abnormally large number of new backers on days 2, 3, and 4, to the Reddit post,
even if it had no effect. Unfortunately, our only hope is these events are rare enough not to bias the
results.13
12Unfortunately, there is no clear natural experiment in the data, either.
13Formally, we assume there are no such events. However, the empirical strategy does allow previous period
7
Figure 1.3: The Reddit front page. User-submitted posts are the subject of this paper (not banner
ads).
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Figure 1.4: Histograms of the number of posts per project and number of comments per project-day
with a new post.
Figure 1.5: Distribution of Reddit posts across projects’ funding cycles.
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Reddit posts may also be directly correlated with other social media attention. Posts can be
made by the entrepreneur themselves, so we might expect the timing of Reddit posts to be corre-
lated with Facebook or Twitter, for example. In this case, a variable measuring Reddit activity is
also capturing activity on other platforms. This is not particularly problematic, though, as our re-
sults can simply be interpreted as the effect of all social media attention to the extent it is correlated
in time with Reddit posts.
1.3.3 Empirical Strategy
Our ultimate goal is to assess the effect of several variables on the number of new backers pledg-
ing to a project on a particular day: the proportion of goal raised, a dummy variable if there was
a Reddit post about this project, and the interaction of the two. Two difficulties arise from this
goal which prevent us from simply using OLS. First, projects have inherently different sizes in
terms of the number of backers who would, or do, pledge. Consequently, an additive effect would
not always be comparable across projects. For this reason, the empirical model must allow mul-
tiplicative effects and some “base” level of backers variation across projects. Therefore, we take
the natural log of new backers (plus one to deal with zero backers) as our dependent variable, and
include project fixed effects. Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) use a Poisson regression model with
project fixed effects for similar reasons.
Second, each of the independent variables of interest is reasonably affected by previous period
errors. That is, if there were a shock of more new backers in the past, we may expect today’s
proportion of the goal raised to be higher and the probability of having a Reddit post to be higher
as well. However, Poisson with fixed effects assumes strict exogeneity—that previous period errors
are uncorrelated with current period independent variables.14 Therefore, we relax this assumption
by using a dynamic panel methodology based on Arellano and Bond (1991).
The underlying regression equation for empirical analysis is
yit = β1xi,t + β2zi,t + ηi + εit
where
• yit = ln(NewBackersit+1) andNewBackersit is the net number of new backers pledging
to project i on day t.
• xi,t is a vector of predetermined variables. That is, xi,t may be correlated with εi,1:t−1 but
not εi,t:T .15 xi,t may include lags of predetermined variables as well, for example, the lagged
unobserved shocks to affect the likelihood of a Reddit post.
14See Wooldridge (1997) for an explanation.
15εi,1:t−1 is the vector (εi,1, . . . , εi,t−1) and εi,t:T is the vector (εi,t, . . . , εi,T ).
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proportion of the goal raised.
• zi,t is a vector of (possibly lagged) strictly exogenous variables. That is, zi,t is uncorrelated
with all εi,1:T . zi,t will include dummy variables for the day of the week, for example.
• ηi is project-specific fixed effect.
• εit is idiosyncratic error.
The net number of new backers is generally nonnegative, but it is possible for a backer to cancel
his or her pledge prior to the end of the funding cycle. Therefore, projects with at least one negative
realization of new backers are dropped, as are projects with all zero outcomes.
We estimate (β1, β2) using generalized method of moments (GMM) with moment conditions
very close to Arellano and Bond (1991) using the differenced equation,
∆yit = β1∆xi,t + β2∆zi,t + ∆εit.
The lagged levels of xi,t are correlated with ∆xi,t but uncorrelated with the differenced errors ∆εit,
so
E[xi,t−1∆εit] = 0 for t = 2, . . . T
which also holds for all lags of xi,t−1. However, ∆εit are serially correlated to some extent in
our data, so we use lags of four periods or greater for moment conditions involving predetermined
variables. Far lagged levels may also be weak instruments for the differenced term, so we limit
the lags to five periods. Therefore, each predetermined variable contributes two moments for each
available time period.
The strictly exogenous variables ∆zi,t instrument for themselves,
E[∆zi
T∆εi] = 0
and each contribute one moment.16 The two-step estimator from Arellano and Bond (1991) is used
with finite sample bias-corrected standard errors from Windmeijer (2005), unless otherwise stated.
The estimation methodology we use is similar to that of Qiu (2013), but the form of the re-
gression equation is different. Instead of ln(NewBackersit + 1) on the left hand side, Qiu
(2013) uses the cumulative outcome Backersit as an outcome with lagged Backersit−1 on the
right hand side.17 Therefore, the interpretation of coefficients is additive, whereas our model is
multiplicative—more similar to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017). Qiu (2013) must also assume the
16∆zi is the vector (∆zi,1, . . . ,∆zi,T ) and ∆εi is the vector (∆εi,1, . . . ,∆εi,T ).
17Qiu (2013) also has a specification using the cumulative pledge amount in dollars in place of backers.
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autoregressive process {Backersit} is stationary conditional on other covariates, which is quite
strong in this application. Once a backer pledges they rarely cancel their pledge, so that additional
backer is likely maintained in the level of Backersit forever.
To handle the high degree of persistence in the process and thus the weak instruments prob-
lem,18 Qiu (2013) uses the system GMM approach from Blundell and Bond (1998) which adds
additional moments based on lagged differences being correlated with current period levels. Al-
though this approach reduces bias, it still requires stationarity, and it requires an additional assump-
tion on the initial value of Backersi1. Specifically, deviations of Backersi1 from the unobserved
heterogeneity, ηi, must be uncorrelated with the level of ηi conditional on other covariates.19 For
example, projects with a high unobserved quality must not be more likely to have abnormally high
initial backers—an assumption unlikely to hold in this context.
Qiu’s (2013) specification also does not directly measure the effect of the proportion of the goal
raised, which is of particular economic interest, especially given the hard cutoff of one (success
or failure). Moreover, Qiu (2013) includes current period measures of Twitter activity (analogous
to Reddit posts) which introduces endogeneity concerns; consumers may post on Twitter as a
consequence of backing a project, rather than the other way round. We are not immune to similar
endogeneity concerns, but we limit them by lagging our measures of Reddit activity.
1.4 Empirical Results
We present two branches of empirical results. The first is an analysis of the dynamic behavior
discussed earlier—that a project receives more new backers the closer it is to reaching its goal.
We compare these dynamics between large and small projects and provide a partial replication of
Kuppuswamy and Bayus’s (2017) findings. The second branch of results reveals the positive effects
of advertising on the the number of new backers pledging to a project as well as the interaction
between the advertising effect and the proportion of the goal raised.
We include “day in funding cycle” fixed effects, so in order to maintain a consistent interpre-
tation across projects, we use a subset of projects which last exactly 30 days.20 In Appendix A.2,
we provide a Poisson regression similar to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) with similar results, so
the selection of our subset is unlikely to have significantly distorted results.
18If {Backersit} has a root close to unity, lagged levels will be weakly correlated with current period differences.
19For details, see Section 4.2 of Blundell and Bond (1998).
20Of the full sample, projects which last 30 days comprise nearly half of all projects.
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1.4.1 Without Advertising
In the first specification, we measure the effect of the proportion of the goal raised on the number
of new backers pledging to a project (per day). The day of week, day in the funding cycle, number
of other active projects, and number of new backers to other projects are included as controls.
Specifically, the strictly exogenous variables in zit are:
• Dummy variables for each day 2-29 in the funding cycle. Day 1 is removed because of lags
for other variables. Day 30 is left out as the reference to avoid the dummy variable trap.
• Dummy variables for Monday-Saturday. Sunday is the reference.
• The number of other (j 6= i) active projects in i’s category, NumOtherProjectsit.
The predetermined variables in xit are:
• Dummy variables which bin the lagged proportion of goal raised, PropGoali,t−1, into five
bins: 0.2-0.4, 0.4-0.6, 0.6-0.8, 0.8-1, and ≥ 1. The left out reference bin is 0-0.2.
• The number of new backers pledging to other (j 6= i) projects in i’s category,
NumOtherNewbackersit.
Table 1.2 displays the results for all projects, projects with a goal smaller than $10,000, and
projects with a goal of at least $10,000. Recall the left hand side of the regression equation is
ln(NewBackersit + 1), so the exponentiated coefficient (exp(β̂)) for a variable is roughly the
multiplicative effect of a one unit increase in that variable on NewBackersit. For example, a
project which was 60-80% funded yesterday may expect exp(0.356) = 1.43 times as many new
backers today as if it was 0-20% funded yesterday.21 Consistent with previous literature, we see
the largest increase in the number of new backers when a project is 80-100% towards its goal, and
the effect drops off after the project has met its goal. This phenomenon exists both for small and
large projects. We also see more backers pledge at the beginning and end of the funding cycle.
1.4.2 With Advertising
Now, we measure the effect of new Reddit posts on the number of new backers pledging to a
project with lags of the dummy variable RedditPostsit > 0 which is equal to one if and only if
project i had at least one new Reddit post on day t.22 The day of week, day in the funding cycle,
21Recall 0-0.2 is the reference bin for the dummy variable 0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8.
22Reddit posts may be visible on the first few pages of a subreddit for several days, but this variable only measures
posts actually written on day t. Reddit’s default ranking algorithm (“Hot”) is such that new posts are given considerably
more weight. This is apparent in Figure 1.3 where none of the top seven posts are older than 10 hours.
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Table 1.2: Arellano-Bond estimation of ln(new backers +1) on lagged proportion of goal raised
and controls.
(1) (2) (3)
All projects Goal < $10k Goal ≥ $10k
Variables coef se coef se coef se
t = 2 -0.536*** (0.0119) -0.501*** (0.0132) -0.526*** (0.0200)
t = 3 -0.707*** (0.0145) -0.649*** (0.0157) -0.714*** (0.0247)




t = 27 -0.589*** (0.0109) -0.555*** (0.0124) -0.626*** (0.0198)
t = 28 -0.520*** (0.00923) -0.493*** (0.0108) -0.561*** (0.0168)
t = 29 -0.350*** (0.00783) -0.351*** (0.00974) -0.356*** (0.0134)
Monday 0.0653*** (0.00557) 0.0560*** (0.00623) 0.0954*** (0.00879)
Tuesday 0.0457*** (0.00726) 0.0437*** (0.00745) 0.0714*** (0.0116)
Wednesday 0.0488*** (0.00626) 0.0461*** (0.00670) 0.0710*** (0.0105)
Thursday 0.0294*** (0.00625) 0.0307*** (0.00652) 0.0481*** (0.0104)
Friday 0.0131*** (0.00407) 0.00796* (0.00481) 0.0301*** (0.00727)
Saturday -0.0384*** (0.00398) -0.0355*** (0.00473) -0.0467*** (0.00665)
0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.461*** (0.0717) 0.259*** (0.0650) 0.548*** (0.156)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.349*** (0.0674) 0.175*** (0.0605) 0.435*** (0.152)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.356*** (0.0656) 0.174*** (0.0600) 0.518*** (0.147)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 0.828*** (0.0650) 0.609*** (0.0620) 1.091*** (0.141)
1 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 -0.0130 (0.0542) -0.190*** (0.0474) 0.238* (0.130)
NumOtherProjectsit -0.0116*** (0.00142) -0.00782*** (0.00153) -0.0131*** (0.00193)
NumOtherNewbackersit 0.000525*** (6.36e-05) 0.000386*** (7.90e-05) 0.000500*** (7.27e-05)
Observations 313,142 188,935 124,207
Number of projects 10,798 6,515 4,283
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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number of other active projects, number of new backers to other projects, and the proportion of the
goal raised are also included as controls. The lagged post indicators are treated as predetermined
variables in xit.
Table 1.3 displays the results. We do see a positive effect of Reddit posts which is statistically
and economically significant. Economic intuition suggests the positive effect of posts should be
monotonically diminishing in the few days following a new post, but our estimates are not precise
enough to make that determination. 23 If there was a Reddit post about project i three days ago,
the expected number of new backers today is about 2.2 times what it would be without a post.
One may be worried the positive effect of posts occurs only for successful projects. Therefore,
we split the sample into successful and unsuccessful projects, and see that Reddit posts have a
significant and positive effect for both groups. The results appear in Table 1.4. Unfortunately,
the estimates are not precise enough to determine whether the marginal effects are different across
successful and unsuccessful projects.
Next, we consider the effect of the potential viewership on the relative effect of posts. Reddit
is separated into “subreddits” which effectively categorize posts.24 For example there is an Art
subreddit, a Gaming subreddit, and even a Kickstarter subreddit. Each subreddit has a different
level of viewership which can be measured by the number of “subscribers” to that subreddit. We
sum the number of subreddit subscribers who could see posts on a given project-day and split this
number into three categories: under 25 thousand, between 25 and 100 thousand, and over 100
thousand.25 We lag this variable to t−3 and present the results in Table 1.5. There does not appear
to be a statistically significant difference in effect size across subreddit viewership.
Activity of other users in a Reddit post may also affect the number of new backers, so we count
the number of new comments made on posts linking to a given project each day.26 The results are
presented in Table 1.6. Our estimates are not precise enough to reject a zero effect of number of
comments. Keep in mind comments may not be positive about a Kickstarter project, so we are
only measuring activity, not whether consumers think the project is good.
Next, we consider the effect of Reddit posts about other projects in any category. Posts about
other projects on Reddit may be expected to drive traffic to Kickstarter, which could in turn lead to
more backers for the project of interest. The number of Reddit posts about other projects is treated
as strictly exogenous and appears in zit. The results presented in Table 1.7 suggest the effect is
positive but not statistically significant.
23Recall day 30 is the reference, so we expect the coefficients on the time fixed effects to be negative but closer to
zero near the ends of the funding cycle.
24By default, a user visiting Reddit.com at the time of our sample viewed the Frontpage subreddit which is actually
a compilation of the top posts from many different subreddits. At the time of our sample, those were essentially the
largest subreddits which were “safe for work.”
25These variables are treated as predetermined and appear in xit.
26These variables are treated as predetermined and appear in xit.
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Table 1.3: Arellano-Bond estimation of ln(new backers +1) on lagged Reddit posts and controls.
coef se
t = 4 -0.148*** (0.0393)
t = 5 -0.202*** (0.0350)




t = 27 -0.434*** (0.00928)
t = 28 -0.413*** (0.00847)







0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.242*** (0.0685)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.423*** (0.0816)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.666*** (0.0924)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 1.084*** (0.0935)
1 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 0.733*** (0.106)
NumOtherProjectsit -0.00267** (0.00108)
NumOtherNewbackersit 9.20e-05** (4.18e-05)
RedditPostst−1 > 0 1.619*** (0.298)
RedditPostst−2 > 0 0.449* (0.240)
RedditPostst−3 > 0 0.785*** (0.170)
Observations 280,748
Number of projects 10,798
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4: Arellano-Bond estimation of ln(new backers +1) on lagged Reddit posts—separated
into successful and unsuccessful groups.
(Successful) (Unsuccessful)
coef se coef se
t = 4 -0.522*** (0.0332) -0.222*** (0.0498)






t = 28 -0.654*** (0.0136) -0.338*** (0.00867)
t = 29 -0.398*** (0.0114) -0.241*** (0.00835)
Monday 0.150*** (0.00707) 0.0361*** (0.00375)
Tuesday 0.143*** (0.00834) 0.0307*** (0.00468)
Wednesday 0.132*** (0.00804) 0.0285*** (0.00431)
Thursday 0.0954*** (0.00788) 0.0227*** (0.00443)
Friday 0.0312*** (0.00691) 0.00685** (0.00340)
Saturday -0.0878*** (0.00626) -0.0169*** (0.00327)
0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.250*** (0.0266) -0.178 (0.269)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.431*** (0.0286) -0.0836 (0.364)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.598*** (0.0341) 0.878* (0.456)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 1.027*** (0.0372) 0.761 (0.661)
1 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 0.249*** (0.0422)
NumOtherProjectsit -0.00238* (0.00130) -0.000749 (0.000933)
NumOtherNewbackersit 7.38e-05 (4.93e-05) 5.55e-05 (3.42e-05)
RedditPostst−1 > 0 0.432** (0.214) 0.533** (0.249)
RedditPostst−2 > 0 0.133 (0.180) 0.268 (0.207)
RedditPostst−3 > 0 0.494*** (0.135) 0.299** (0.130)
Observations 133,094 147,654
Number of projects 5,119 5,679
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Arellano-Bond estimation of ln(new backers +1) on lagged Reddit posts by subreddit
size.
coef se
t = 4 -0.132*** (0.0397)




t = 28 -0.417*** (0.00857)







0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.264*** (0.0673)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.450*** (0.0805)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.693*** (0.0906)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 1.131*** (0.0917)







Number of projects 10,798
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Arellano-Bond estimation of ln(new backers +1) on lagged Reddit posts and comments.
coef se
t = 4 -0.112*** (0.0362)




t = 28 -0.414*** (0.00842)







0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.290*** (0.0643)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.473*** (0.0769)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.719*** (0.0870)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 1.148*** (0.0880)
1 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 0.795*** (0.0996)
NumOtherProjectsit -0.00260** (0.00102)
NumOtherNewbackersit 9.31e-05** (3.96e-05)
RedditPostst−1 > 0 0.860*** (0.159)
RedditPostst−2 > 0 0.425*** (0.135)





Number of projects 10,798
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Arellano-Bond estimation of ln(new backers +1) on Reddit posts about other projects.
coef se
t = 2 -0.536*** (0.0119)
t = 3 -0.707*** (0.0145)
t = 4 -0.797*** (0.0159)




t = 28 -0.520*** (0.00922)







0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.458*** (0.0714)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.347*** (0.0672)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.354*** (0.0654)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 0.826*** (0.0648)





Number of projects 10,798
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.4.3 Advertising Interacted With Funding
Reddit posts may have a varying effect depending on the project’s funding state at the time of the
post. In general, we intuit more consumers will pledge immediately if the project has already met
its goal or is very likely to do so. We discuss more reasoning behind this idea in Chapter 2, but
one simple explanation is that consumers care about the probability a project will be successful
because they do not want to waste time creating an account and/or typing in a credit card number
otherwise. To assess this effect in the data, we regress the number of new backers on interactions
of the lagged funding state and a dummy variable for a new post.27
The results are presented in Table 1.8. The interaction terms for 80-100% and ≥ 100% are
positive and significant. While the other interactions are not significant, they still remain positive
when combined with the post dummy variable, which suggests the total effect of Reddit posts
measured earlier is not only because of the large effects above 80% funding. Reddit posts appear
to have a significantly larger effect on days when a project is fully funded (or close) compared to
days when it is not.
1.4.4 Back-of-the-envelope Calculations
Using the coefficient estimates from Table 1.3, some back-of-the-envelope calculations reveal the
magnitude of the effect of Reddit posts in dollars raised by Kickstarter projects. The following
calculations are based on correlations in our sample and would require truly exogenous variation
in the timing of posts (through an experiment, for example) for a causal interpretation. For projects
with only one post-day, suppose that post-day is removed. Then, the number of new backers on the
following day would be lower by a factor of exp(−1.619) ≈ 0.2 on average, using the specification
in Table 1.3. If we assume the dollar pledge by each backer is the same, we may estimate the
change in dollars raised without a post. If we sum the effects from the three days following a post,
the median loss in dollars raised is $354 across projects.
Those fewer dollars raised may be carried forward to possibly change the proportion of goal
raised, PropGoali,t, in subsequent periods. If we account for this full dynamic effect, the median
fewer dollars raised across projects is $435. Removing posts resulted in 86 successful projects in
this group (of 398) becoming unsuccessful.
The same process may be carried out for projects with no post-days by adding a post. If we add
a post on day 3 for projects which had no posts, the median extra dollars raised is $166. Part of this
large deviation from the numbers above may be due to the different features (size, for example) of
projects which had a Reddit post in our sample and those which did not. Additionally, the effect of
a post we estimate is only multiplicative when in reality it may be additive (or both); multiplying
27All of the interactions are treated as predetermined and appear in xit.
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Table 1.8: Arellano-Bond estimation of ln(new backers +1) on lagged interaction of Reddit posts
and funding state.
coef se
t = 2 0.241*** (0.0423)
t = 3 0.0500 (0.0369)
t = 4 -0.0638* (0.0329)




t = 28 -0.412*** (0.00843)







0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.285*** (0.0632)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.474*** (0.0756)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.717*** (0.0853)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 1.143*** (0.0859)
1 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 0.775*** (0.0981)
NumOtherProjectsit -0.00233** (0.000981)
NumNewbackersOtherit 7.02e-05* (3.86e-05)
RedditPostst−1 > 0 -0.0586 (0.421)
(0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4) ∗ (RedditPostst−1 > 0) 0.909 (0.568)
(0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6) ∗ (RedditPostst−1 > 0) 0.487 (0.574)
(0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8) ∗ (RedditPostst−1 > 0) 0.722 (0.596)
(0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1) ∗ (RedditPostst−1 > 0) 1.771*** (0.590)
(1 ≤ PropGoali,t−1) ∗ (RedditPostst−1 > 0) 1.481*** (0.522)
Observations 302,344
Number of projects 10,798
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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an already small number (net dollars raised on the relevant days) does not result in a large absolute
increase. Only 77 (of 7,653) unsuccessful projects were made successful by adding a Reddit post.
This is not particularly surprising given that very few unsuccessful projects finish close to their
goal—see Figure 1.2.
1.5 Discussion and Future Research
The primary contribution of this paper is an empirical analysis of backer behavior in reward-based
crowdfunding markets. We found results similar to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) with a separate
sample: backers are concentrated at the beginning and end of the funding cycle, and backers are
more likely to pledge the closer a project is to its goal—but only until the project is fully funded.
We also assessed the impact of social media advertising via Reddit posts. There are more new
backers pledging to a project in the days following a Reddit post about the project, and the effect
appears stronger if the project has already met its goal. Prior to reaching the goal, Reddit posts
have about the same (multiplicative) effect for unsuccessful and successful projects. However,
potential viewership of the post and the number of comments on a post do not have a statistically
significant effect on the number of new backers.
Given the novelty of the crowdfunding industry, the bulk of literature has been descriptive in
nature. However, a deeper understanding of consumer behavior will be valuable as the industry
grows, especially now that equity-based crowdfunding regulations have been relaxed. One way to
move forward is to structurally model consumers’ behavior and analyze their beliefs more care-
fully. In Chapter 2, we discuss a theoretical model of consumer behavior which may move us
toward such a goal. Unfortunately, this also requires finer data, in particular accurate measures
of traffic to crowdfunding project pages to disentangle a change in traffic from a change in the
likelihood of pledging.
Given the recent relaxation of equity-based crowdfunding in the United States, future research
on the effects of advertising in this context, especially the extent to which it is persuasive versus
informative, will prove valuable. Regulators face trade-offs when determining exactly how and to
whom entrepreneurs can advertise investment their new product or business. Promoting innovation
by enabling entrepreneurs to acquire funding is important, but consumers are necessarily exposed
to substantial risk—which could exceed that of traditional publicly traded securities. We hope




A Theoretical Analysis of Consumer Behavior and
Advertising in Crowdfunding Markets
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a model of consumer behavior which implies some of the empirical
results described in Chapter 1. We focus on the consumer’s beliefs and decisions primarily because
the data from Chapter 1 admit analysis only of consumers’ decisions. Although the entrepreneur’s
choices of project goal, length, and advertising decisions are interesting, we consider those choices
to be exogenous for our purposes. Moreover, those decisions depend upon the preferences and
behavior of consumers, so this is a natural starting point.
Given the growth of the reward-based crowdfunding industry and the recent relaxation of equity
crowdfunding regulation in the United States, a deeper understanding of how consumers think and
behave is valuable to entrepreneurs, crowdfunding platforms, and regulators. Entrepreneurs and
platforms want to know how and when consumers pledge to encourage an optimal matching of
projects and backers. Regulators need to know how advertising affects consumers’ decisions when
evaluating policy which restricts advertising. The goal of this chapter is thus to move forward our
theoretical understanding of consumer behavior in these markets.
The primary contribution of this chapter is to show that simple consumer preferences can imply
the acceleration in the number of project backers as a project nears its goal. A key finding in the
data, though, is that the number of new backers per day drops back down (not to zero but to a lower
level) after the project meets its goal. The model presented implies this effect. If the model was
purely one of higher funding signaling higher quality, we would expect the rate of new backers to
continually increase even past 100% funding.
An additional contribution is the model implies the immediate effect of advertising is generally
increasing in the proportion of the goal raised (really the probability of success), which is consistent
with the empirical results from Chapter 1. Intuitively, consumers learn about the project from
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advertising but may or may not pledge immediately. A higher funding percentage increases the
likelihood that they pledge immediately, which gives the result.
With better data than what we have in Chapter 1, the dynamic model could be structurally
estimated. One valuable outcome of structural estimation would be a measure of the relative time
cost that consumers spend to mechanically pledge versus how much they spend to return to the
project page in the future (which one could interpret as a cost of attention as well). The implications
of the theoretical model suggest the this difference in cost can have an impact on whether a project
is funded or not. If the relative cost of returning in the future is high, then consumers are more
likely to pledge immediately or leave forever, which in turn affects the amount of funding raised
and the probability of success of the project.
2.2 Literature Review
Theoretical economic literature has not focused much on crowdfunding specifically, but the general
concepts are quite similar to the economics of public good provision which has seen extensive
work. In the crowdfunding context, the success of the project (i.e. reaching the goal) is itself a
public good, while the product delivered is typically a private good.
Vesterlund (2003) proposes a theoretical model of charitable fundraising with imperfect in-
formation and differences in project quality. In her model, the charity is able to reveal initial
contributions or not, and the revelation of large contributions signals a high quality project to re-
maining donors. She shows there exist equilibria where revealing initial contributions is optimal
and improves the total funds raised for high quality charities relative to the perfect information
case. In our context, all contributions are revealed and consumers have imperfect information, but
consumers consider only one project at a time.
Andreoni (2006) alters Vesterlund’s (2003) model by allowing more variation of project qual-
ity, and allows the leading donor(s) to self select. Heterogeneity among donors in the cost of
learning the project’s quality results in a signaling effect where high quality projects are revealed
by receiving more contributions early on. While this does not exactly explain the dynamics we
observe in crowdfunding, it provides a nice foundation for the reasoning that consumers will be
more likely to pledge as a project is closer to its goal. Our theoretical model focuses more on con-
sumers’ belief about the probability of success, which quality may enter implicitly. Consumers in
our model also have heterogeneous costs of contributing while the believed probability of success
does not vary across consumers.
In the Andreoni (2006) and Vesterlund (2003), the outcome (amount of contributions) is con-
tinuous, but crowdfunding has an important binary component in reaching the goal or not. Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1984) consider a simultaneous-move game where the public good is binary—either
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provided or not—and the cost of contributing is constant across players. In cases with and with-
out refunds there are many pure and mixed strategy equilibria, but the mixed strategy equilibria
become close to pure strategies as the number of players increases. Cadsby and Maynes (1999)
consider a similar model but with continuous contributions which may vary across players. They
experimentally test the effect of different features of the game on the likelihood of provision, find-
ing continuous contributions increase the likelihood of provision compared to a binary contribution
amount. Refunding contributions if provision fails also improves the likelihood of provision. In
our model, the consumers have a trinary decision to pledge with heterogeneous non-refundable
costs of doing so, to wait, or to leave.1
Makris (2009) propose a model with some portion of players who have a dominant strategy to
contribute to the public good—warm-glow altruists. All players are uncertain about the number
of total players and the number of warm-glow altruists. Notably, if the total number of players
is Poisson distributed, the number of equilibrium contributors is uniquely determined. Moreover,
the expected equilibrium number of contributors converges to that of the symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium of the no uncertainty game as the expected total number of players increases. This idea
of uncertainty about the number and composition of other players is analogous to crowdfunding,
but the game in Makris (2009) is still simultaneous-move. The key source of uncertainty in our
dynamic model is the number of consumers who will learn about the project in future periods.
Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) consider the provision of a threshold public good in a dynamic
context where consumers have private information about their own cost. In the model, consumers
are able to supply the good themselves and choose an optimal waiting time in equilibrium, which
is decreasing in cost. In an equilibrium with finite consumers, the good is not immediately (and
thus not efficiently) supplied unless some consumer has zero cost; however, the expected time until
the good is supplied goes to zero as the number of consumers goes to infinity.2 Gradstein (1992)
studies a model similar to Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) but with a production function of the public
good which is increasing in the number of contributions.3 With this change, the inefficient waiting
time does not go to zero as the number of consumers increases. Our paper has similar ideas to
these in the sense that consumers do wait to pledge, but they do so because they are unsure about
the total number of consumers who will be aware of the project at the final time period.
Marx and Matthews (2000) consider a dynamic public good provision game with a fixed, but
possibly infinite, time horizon. Consumers may make continuous contributions at each stage, and
1Consumers also receive utility for “eating” the good which may be thought of net the dollar pledge amount.
Consumers either eat the good and pay the dollar amount or do not eat the good and do not pay the dollar amount—
because they did not pledge or the project was not successful. Therefore, the only relevant cost is a non-refundable
cost of time to pledge.
2See the paper for details of additional assumptions.
3The production function also has diminishing marginal product. The “production function” in Bliss and Nalebuff
(1984) is binary: the good is provided if and only if at least one person contributes.
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are motivated to contribute prior to the final period by a threat of punishment in the form of lower
contributions by other consumers in the future. Marx and Matthews (2000) show that given a
sufficiently high discount factor and sufficiently long time horizon, projects will be completed in
finite time under relatively general assumptions. In our model, consumers are motivated to pledge
early to avoid some cost of waiting, and any given consumer waiting does not affect the decisions
of other consumers (as long as that consumer is around in the last period).
There has been some crowdfunding-specific theoretical work as well. Qiu (2013) proposes
a two period theoretical model to explain the type of acceleration in new backers we observe in
Chapter 1. In the model, consumers have the option of delaying their pledge to observe what others
do, and can also expend some effort advertising so that the project has a higher chance of success.
In our model, consumers are small in the sense they do not consider their own pledge having a
direct effect on the probability of success. Li and Duan (2016) propose a model more similar to
our dynamic model. Consumers arrive according to a Poisson process and realize a heterogenous
valuation at each time period. In our case, consumers draw some individual cost of pledging and
then possibly choose to remain aware of the project for future time periods; whereas, consumers
in Li and Duan (2016) are “new” each period.
2.3 Model Definition
In the context of reward-based crowdfunding, backers only receive a reward if the project is suc-
cessful, and consumption of the reward may happen months after the fundraising period while
monetary payment happens at the end of the fundraising period.4 Moreover, consumption of the
reward happens at the same time for all backers regardless of when the backer pledged during
the fundraising period.5 However, backers still pay some cost of time to go through the pledging
process, which may include creating an account and typing in a credit card number.6 Given these
facts, it is not surprising to see some backers wait until the very end of a project’s funding cycle
to pledge, even if the project is already successful—see Table 1.4 in Chapter 1 for some evidence.
One simple explanation for this behavior is those backers are discounting the cost of time to pledge,
so they prefer to pledge at the last moment even if the project is already successful. If consumers
are able to discount the cost of pledging but not the benefit which is realized at some fixed point
in the future, then they naturally wait as long as possible to pledge. But of course, there are many
4For large pledges, the payment processor may place a hold on the backer’s credit card, so in that case the backer
could be temporarily credit constrained.
5In practice, a few projects do have multiple production runs and prefer earlier backers for the earlier production
runs. We ignore these types of projects in this paper.
6Kickstarter.com reports that as of September 2016, about 69% of backers only back one project, so creating an
account is a frequent requirement.
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other consumers who pledge earlier in the funding cycle, and it is the behavior of these consumers
were are concerned with explaining.
One other cost consumers may be faced with is a cost of attention. If a consumer does not
pledge today but wishes to possibly pledge in the future, he or she must remember to return to
the project’s web page at some time in the future (and actually do so). In the model we propose,
this cost of attention plays a key role in the consumer’s decision to pledge now, to wait and return
tomorrow, or to forget about the project completely. When the consumer faces this decision, there
is some uncertainty about whether the project will eventually be successful or not. Therefore, the
fundamental trade-off is to pledge now and assume the risk of project failure (thus wasting the time
cost of pledging) or wait to gain more information (or leave completely).
For an individual consumer, define
• ci > 0 as the cost of time (in dollars) for consumer i to pledge, e.g. create an account and
enter payment information,
• vi > 0 as consumer i’s net benefit of consuming the reward, i.e. marginal benefit of “eating”
the good minus the dollar pledge amount, and
• λ > 0 as the cost of attention (in dollars) to return one period in the future. Note λ does
not vary across consumers, but the model could easily be changed to allow additional het-
erogeneity.
We now make some assumptions to simplify further discussion. First, normalize vi = 1 and
assume ci is drawn from a distribution Fc on (0, 1), i.e. we only consider consumers who would
pledge to the project when it is certain to be successful. Second, restrict λ to also be less than 1; if
it were equal to or greater than one, it would never be optimal to wait. Third, assume consumers
are risk-neutral and do not discount future periods. Finally, assume consumers are infinitesimal
and thus do not have an individual effect on the probability the project is successful.
Let time periods be indexed by t ∈ {0, . . . , T} with finite T, and suppose
• an Mt mass of consumers learn about the project at each t, with Mt drawn from the distribu-
tion Fm(m).
• Zt is the number of consumers who are aware of the project at t, including Mt and all
previous consumers who have not left completely (i.e. they could have previously chosen
to pledge or to wait). Zt will depend on both {Mt} realizations and the policy function of
consumers, defined in a moment.
• Bt is the number of consumers who have pledged to the project before period t; Bt does not
include consumers who will choose to pledge at t.
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• G is the goal number of consumers. The project is considered successful if BT+1 ≥ G.
If a consumer is aware of the project during period t, he or she observesM1, . . . ,Mt and will be
able to compute Zt. Suppose in the final period all aware consumers who have not already pledged
choose to pledge if and only if ZT ≥ G. In other words, if everyone at T could jointly pledge to
make the project successful, they will do so. If the project would not meet the goal even if everyone
at T pledged, nobody pledges. Note that ZT depends not only on the realizations of Mt but also
the choices of consumers at each period. Now, the probability the project will be successful given
information available at t is
st = Pt(ZT (M1, . . . ,MT , h1, . . . , hT ) ≥ G|M1, . . . ,Mt, h1, . . . , ht). (2.1)
where ht is the policy function defined in Equations 2.6 and 2.7. Before writing the form of the
function Zt(M1, . . . ,Mt, h1, . . . , ht), let us define
φ(c, a, b,M1, . . . ,Mb) =
1 if none of ha(M1, . . . ,Ma; c), . . . , hb(M1, . . . ,Mb; c) are “leave”0 if any of ha(M1, . . . ,Ma; c), . . . , hb(M1, . . . ,Mb; c) are “leave”
(2.2)
where b ≥ a. In other words, φ(c, a, b,M1, . . . ,Mb) is equal to one if and only if a consumer with
ci = c who first learned about the project at period a chose not to leave at any period from a to b,
inclusive. Now we may write, Zt, the number of consumers aware of the project at t:






φ(c, k, t− 1,M1, . . . ,Mt−1)fc(c)dc (2.3)
where fc(c) is the density which ci are drawn from.
The value function of a consumer with cost ci aware of the project at t < T is therefore
Vt(M1, . . . ,Mt; ci) = max

st − ci pledge now
Et[Vt+1(M1, . . . ,Mt+1; ci)]− λ wait
0 leave
(2.4)
VT (M1, . . . ,MT ; ci) =
1− ci if ZT ≥ G0 if ZT < G (2.5)
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and the policy function is analogous:
ht(M1, . . . ,Mt; ci) = argmax

st − ci pledge now
Et[Vt+1(M1, . . . ,Mt+1; ci)]− λ wait
0 leave
(2.6)
hT (M1, . . . ,MT ; ci) =
pledge now if ZT ≥ Gleave if ZT < G (2.7)
Notice how st depends not only on M1, . . . ,Mt but also the primitives of the model (T , Fm,
Fc, λ) and the policy function of consumers. The probability is really over future realizations of
Mt because consumers know the policy function given c and the distribution of c, so they can
compute how many people will pledge/wait/leave given some Mt realization. The policy function
also depends on st, so equilibrium is reached when Equations 2.1-2.7 hold for every t and every
possible {M1, . . . ,MT} realization. There may be multiple equilibria depending on the primitives
of the model.
2.4 Implications of the Model
It may be useful to first visualize a policy function in s and c space in equilibrium. Suppose there
are only two periods, then the policy function in the first period is
h1(M1; ci) = argmax

s1 − ci pledge now




s1 − ci pledge now




pledge now if ci ≤
λ
1− s1
and ci ≤ s1






leave if ci > s1 and ci >
s1 − λ
s1
h1 is illustrated in Figure 2.1 for two different values of λ. In each of the plots, the dark
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Figure 2.1: Plots of h1 with different λ.
(a) λ = 0.1 (b) λ = 0.4
green shaded area represents s1, ci combinations where consumer i will pledge now (in period 1).
Likewise the light red area shows “leave” and the unshaded area shows “wait.” h1 is computed for
each probability of success (on the x-axis) as if the primitives of the model were such that s1 and
h1 were in equilibrium. Notice how given a fixed ci a consumer moves from “leave” to “wait” to
“pledge now” as the probability of success increases. Also, given a fixed s1 the policy function
moves from “leave” to “wait” to “pledge now” as cost decreases. The unshaded area representing
“wait” becomes smaller and eventually empty as λ increases. Just as we might expect, waiting
becomes suboptimal for any c, s as the cost of waiting increases.
2.4.1 Without Advertising
One interesting phenomenon found in previous literature and in Chapter 1 is that the number of
consumers pledging per day increases as a project nears its goal but then drops down afterwards.
In the context of our model, we might expect to see this if some consumers are waiting around and
the probability of success increases over time. If λ is low enough, some proportion of consumers at
each time period will choose to wait instead of pledge now or leave forever. As the project’s proba-
bility of success gets closer to one (and likewise, the proportion of the goal raised nears one), more
and more of the consumers who were waiting will choose to pledge now. As a result, the number
of consumers pledging per period will increase even if Mt is not necessarily increasing. In the few
periods prior to meeting its goal, it may even be possible for the number of consumers pledging
per period to exceed Mt. After the project meets its goal, everyone will pledge immediately, so the
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number of people pledging per day will be exactly Mt.
Given the all-or-nothing nature of the policy function in the final period, this effect cannot
be shown with only a two period model. Therefore, we present a three period example which
illustrates this phenomenon. With discrete distributions of Mt and ci we can solve for the policy
function iteratively, working backwards from the final period. In the penultimate period, we guess
some policy function for each ci and compute the probability of success. Given the probability of
success, we may then calculate the policy function. This process converges to a fixed point quite
quickly; however, it is sensitive to initial conditions for some parameterizations. For example,
if the initial guess of the policy function is for everyone to leave, it may stay at the equilibrium
where everyone leaves immediately, even if there is a more efficient equilibrium (in the sense that
sT−1 > 0) available. Therefore, we initialize the policy function to assume everyone pledges
immediately, so the process is less likely to converge to an inefficient equilibrium.
Our example uses the following parameterization:
• G = 3
• λ = .1
• M1 = 1
• M2 and M3 are drawn from a discrete uniform distribution with 10 possible values equally
spaced between 0.9 and 1.5, inclusive.
• ci are drawn from a discrete uniform distribution with 20 possible values equally spaced
between 0.05 and 0.95, inclusive.
After iterating to find the optimal policy function, the unconditional probability of success at
the first period is found to be s1 = 0.47. The first period policy function, h1 is of the following
form: pledge if ci ≤ ca; wait if ca < ci ≤ cb; leave otherwise; where ca ≈ 0.192 and cb ≈ 0.761.
Proportionally, 20% pledge now, 60% wait, and 20% leave. The second period policy function,
h2, has a similar form with the values of ca and cb depending on the exact realization of M2. To
illustrate the effect of interest, we will focus on the particular realization M2 = 1.23, which is the
lowest realization of M2 such that s2 ≥ s1. With M2 = 1.23, the h2 has ca ≈ 0.287 andcb ≈ 0.856.
Notice that because ca increased from h1 to h2, some of the consumers who waited from period
1 will now pledge in period 2. Therefore, we not only have a larger proportion of M2 consumers
pledging, but also some fraction of previously aware consumers pledging at period 2 as well. This
is precisely the type of acceleration we are looking for.
For higher M2 such that s2 = 1, we see that all types of consumers pledge at t = 2, so counting
the consumers who waited over from period 1, the total number pledging at t = 2 is greater than
32
M2. In the next period t = 3, there are M3 consumers who all pledge. Now in this particular
example t = 3 is the final period, but it is apparent that in a model with more time periods, all
future periods would have all Mt consumers pledging once st = 1 even if t is not the final period.
There remains one small disconnect between the model and the data patterns we observe. When
discussing the model, we have consumers’ exact beliefs about the probability of success and this
probability determines their choices. However, in the data we instead observe the proportion of
the goal raised. We must assume the proportion of the goal raised and consumers’ belief about the
probability of success are positively correlated with one another, at least holding time remaining in
the funding cycle constant, if we are to use the real-world data patterns as evidence of the model’s
applicability. This seems quite a reasonable assumption.
2.4.2 With Advertising
Another interesting data pattern shown in Chapter 1 is the immediate effect of advertising appears
to be stronger when a project is more highly funded. In this section, we show that “advertising”
taking the form of an unanticipated exogenous increase inMt will typically have a larger immediate
effect on the number of pledging consumers when st is higher. In addition, we discuss the optimal
timing of advertising.
First, note the optimal policy function at any period is to pledge now if the probability of
success is one. If st−1 = 1, then no consumers will be waiting over to period t. Therefore, an ma
unit increase in Mt from advertising will be met with exactly an ma unit increase in the number of
consumers pledging at t.7
However, when st is less than one some portion of the consumers aware of the project at t will
choose to wait or leave altogether. An ma increase in Mt in this case has an ambiguous effect
on the number of consumers pledging at t. The larger Mt induces a higher probability of success
which may cause some consumers to flip from wait or leave to pledge now, so the effect of ma is
magnified (call this the “flipping” effect). However, some portion of the ma new consumers will
choose to wait or leave, so the immediate effect of ma is diminished (call this the “leaving” effect).
These two conflicting effects imply the total immediate effect of advertising when st is less than
one is ambiguous. One special case does exist where the total immediate effect is certain to be at
least ma. If st is less than one without advertising but equal to one with advertising, then all of the
ma consumers will pledge now. In addition, some of the Mt consumers who would have left or
waited with st < 0 will now pledge immediately. In general though, we would expect the leaving
effect to overpower the flipping effect for small st.
7Throughout this section, we assume the ma advertised consumers draw from the same distribution of costs, Fc,
as all other consumers. One could imagine consumers who learn about a project from advertising have a different
distribution of costs, but we do not delve into this problem here.
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Table 2.1: Effect of 0.1 Unit of Advertising on the Probability of Success
Advertising Period Probability of Success at t = 1
None 0.47
t = 1 0.67
t = 2 0.57
t = 3 0.48
Table 2.2: Effect of 1 Unit of Advertising on the Probability of Success; M1 = 0.1
Advertising Period Probability of Success at t = 1
None 0.00
t = 1 0.67
t = 2 0.70
t = 3 0.00
Entrepreneurs are likely also concerned about how the timing of advertising affects the project’s
overall probability of success. In light of this fact, we return to the previous numeric example
and explore the effect of advertising at different time periods on the unconditional probability of
success, s1. To be clear, consumers behave as before (as if s1 = 0.47) until the period where
advertising happens—then they update their beliefs and policy function. Table 2.1 displays the
effect of 0.1 unit of advertising on the probability the project is successful. It appears at first glance
that earlier advertising is better, but this is only one parameterization of a three period model.
In Table 2.2 we present similar results but with M1 = 0.1 and the amount of advertising equal
to 1 unit. Under this parameterization, the probability of success is zero without any advertising.
The project still fails when the advertising happens at the last period because consumers in earlier
periods do not anticipate there being any hope of success, and therefore all leave, even though M2
and M3 could be high enough to reach the goal number of consumers. Table 2.2 also shows that
earlier advertising is not unequivocally better.
2.5 Discussion
In this paper we have presented a dynamic model of consumer behavior in crowdfunding markets.
The model allows consumers to consider future periods—both in terms of future utility gains and
changes in the probability of success of the project. Unfortunately, the complexity does not allow
a simple analytic solution to a project’s funding path. However, simulations with reasonable prim-
itives do suggest the dynamic model implies the types of behavior we see in the real world—in
particular, the number of new backers per day accelerates up until the project meets its goal, then
drops back down.
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For future research one could estimate the dynamic model structurally, but this requires finer
data than what we have access to in Chapter 1. One interesting parameter to estimate is λ, which
measures the time cost of consumers returning to check on the project in the future. The ideal
data tracks individual consumers over a project’s life cycle and includes visits to the project’s web
page as well as views of advertising or social media attention elsewhere. However, the model
could still be estimated with data which disentangles traffic to a project’s page from the number
of pledges, which could still be aggregated to the daily level, for example. In Chapter 1, we have
some measures of traffic (posts on Reddit, pledges to other projects, day of week, etc.), but the data
are not fine enough to separate traffic from the propensity to pledge.
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CHAPTER 3
Issues with Inference Using the Synthetic Control
Method
3.1 Introduction
Comparative case studies with few (even one) treated units and aggregate data require selection
of control units for estimation and inference of the treatment effect. Selection of control units has
typically been a subjective procedure which complicates inference. Moreover, conditional on a
selection of control units, the comparability of the controls and treated units relative to a “placebo”
selection is often unclear.
The Synthetic Control Method (SCM) is designed to mitigate these problems. It was first
used by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and later formalized in a seminal paper by Abadie et al.
(2010). The general idea of the SCM is to estimate a weighted average of potential control units
in a data-driven way using pretreatment data. This admits at least three significant benefits: (1) the
weight of each potential control unit is made explicit, (2) the selection procedure can be objectively
repeated in a permutation test for each placebo, (3) the relative fit of the synthetic controls to the
pretreatment realizations is made explicit for the treated unit and placebos.
Abadie et al. (2010) show that as long as “true” weights exist and the data conform to a linear
factor model, the absolute bias of the SCM goes to zero as the number of pretreatment periods
increases. They also show the unbiasedness of the SCM for an autoregressive model with time-
varying coefficients requiring only one pretreatment period.
In this paper, we highlight some data generating processes for which the synthetic control
method exhibits differential performance across units in finite samples. In particular, if the outcome
variable of interest is correlated within groups of units, SCM may result in poor fit of units in small
groups (relative to units in larger groups). If group structure is unobserved, it may be difficult for
the researcher to infer whether the unit of interest is being fit well relative to other units, especially
if the treated unit lies is a small group. However, we show inference based on the mean squared
prediction error ratio is not substantially distorted for units in small groups. Additionally, we
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offer word of warning about including all pretreatment outcomes as economic predictors in the
selection of synthetic weights. Doing so could invalidate inference based on the post/pretreatment
mean squared prediction error (MSPE) ratio if the researcher would have chosen not to report
results when pretreatment MSPE for the treated unit was high.
3.2 Literature Review
There has been a lot of recent econometric work refining and studying the SCM. Abadie et al.
(2014) study the 1990 German reunification and consider explicitly restricting the number of po-
tential control units to limit overfitting. In that particular application, this restriction appears to
have minimal effect on the inferential outcome, except for the case of only one potential control
unit (which also corresponds to substantially poorer pretreatment fit).
Ferman and Pinto (2017) show results similar to ours, albeit more formally. In particular,
they show the SCM can be asymptotically biased when common factors are nonstationary, and
smaller groups of units have a larger proportion of misallocated weights, even in the stationary
case. Kaul et al. (2016) note that including each pretreatment outcome as economic predictors can
significantly bias the SCM estimator when there exist other covariates which are meaningful for
counterfactual prediction; the source of the problem is that the SCM will not place any weight on
these covariates. Despite this fact, Kaul et al. (2016) note several published papers using the SCM
do use pretreatment outcomes as predictors.1 We show that even without other meaningful covari-
ates, including pretreatment outcomes could lead to invalid inference if the researcher chooses to
use the SCM or not based on pretreatment fit of the treated unit.
Firpo and Possebom (2016) formalize the inferential procedures of Abadie et al. (2010) and
introduce confidence sets for the SCM. They also compare the performance of the SCM to simi-
lar diff-in-diff procedures and find the SCM offers improvements, at least for the data generating
processes (DGP) they consider. Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) propose relaxing some of the
restrictions imposed by the SCM, for example that the weights sum to one, and applying regu-
larization techniques such as elastic net to deal with the large number of potential control unit
weights.
A number of papers use the SCM in applied work as well; we note only a few of these below.
Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) apply the SCM to measure the effect of 30 country-level economic
liberalization events on per capita real GDP. Bilgel and Galle (2015) use the SCM to assess tax
incentives for kidney donations. Cavallo et al. (2013) measure the effect of large natural disasters
on GDP growth.
1It is important to note Abadie et al. (2010) only use three of 19 available pretreatment period outcomes and do not
suggest one should use all available outcome, but they do not warn against doing so, either.
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3.3 Synthetic Control Method Setup and Estimation
Suppose there are J + 1 units (e.g. US states) indexed by i where unit i = 1 is the only treated
unit. Further suppose we observe T time periods indexed by t, and let T0 be the last untreated time
period. The observed outcome variable of interest is Yit. Y Nit is the outcome with no treatment,
and Y Iit is the outcome with the treatment. Assume a model with linear additive treatment effects




where αit are the treatment effects of interest, and Dit is a dummy variable equal to one if and only
if unit i has received the treatment by t. For t > T0, we observe only Y Iit for the treated unit i = 1,
and Y Nit for all other units.
To motivate the SCM, Abadie et al. (2010) use a linear factor model:
Y Nit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + εit
where
• δt is an unknown common factor with constant loadings
• Zi is a vector of observed covariates (length r)
• θt is a vector of unknown parameters
• λt is a vector of unobserved common factors with loadings µi and length F , and
• εit is a mean zero shock, independent across units and time.
Estimation of Y N1t , t < T0, for the treated unit is necessary to estimate the treatment effects
αit. Abadie et al. (2010) propose constructing a weighted average of untreated units’ outcomes
which would closely follow the counterfactual (untreated) outcome of the treated unit during post-
treatment periods.
Now consider weights W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)′ with the restrictions wj ≥ 0 and w2 + . . . +





















is bounded by function which goes to zero as the number of pretreatment periods, T0, increases—





However, W ∗ is not observed. The core of the SCM lies in the estimation of Ŵ . Define the
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where Ȳ (m)1 are linear combinations of pretreatment outcomes. Define X0 similarly as a (k × J)
matrix for the untreated units j = 2, . . . , J + 1. Now choose Ŵ to minimize√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W )
where V is a (k × k) symmetric positive-semidefinite matrix of weights on the variables in X .
Abadie et al. (2010) choose V to minimize the mean squared prediction error of the outcome in
pretreatment periods.
The resulting estimator of the treatment effect, α1t, is






j=2 ŵjYjt is called the “synthetic control.”
3.4 Synthetic Control Method Inference
Abadie et al. (2010) propose a type of permutation test to infer whether α̂1t is large relative to what
might be expected due to noise alone—both from the estimation of the weights and the underlying
data-generating process.2 Abadie et al. (2010) apply the SCM to each untreated unit in the sample
to obtain estimates α̂jt for j 6= 1. Intuitively, one may compare α̂1t during posttreatment periods
to the distribution of α̂jt, j 6= 1, during posttreatment periods to see if α̂1t is abnormal and thus
implies a significant non-zero treatment effect.
In practice, some of the units may have poor pretreatment fit (i.e. large α̂jt, t ≤ T0) relative
to other units, which suggests either the SCM performs poorly for these units or these units are
2Although Firpo and Possebom (2016) introduce confidence sets, we stick with Abadie et al.’s (2010) original
inference procedure for this paper.
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simply more noisy. Abadie et al. (2010) handle this problem in two ways.
First, they consider throwing out units with poor pretreatment fit and then visually comparing
α̂1t to α̂jt, j 6= 1 during the posttreatment periods. Specifically, they throw out units with a
pretreatment MSPE some multiple (say, five times) higher than the treated unit of interest.3
















If the ratio for the treated unit, R1, is large relative to the distribution of ratios of all untreated units,
Rj , j 6= 1, one may infer there is a significant treatment effect. More formally, if the treatment
label were assigned to a unit at random, the probability of obtaining a ratio for the labeled unit at
least as high as R1 is ∑J+1
j=1 I(Rj ≥ R1)
J + 1
.
This is conceptually similar to Fisher’s exact test.
3.5 DGPs with Potentially Poor Synthetic Control Performance
We consider a very basic model which allows Zit (now scalar) to vary over time, but only Yit is
now observable:
Y Nit = Zit + εit
Let g(i) = 1, . . . , G index the group which contains unit i, and suppose Zit is equal for units in
the same group, Zit = Zjt if g(i) = g(j). Importantly, g(i) is unobserved to the econometrician.
Now suppose Zg(i)t is an AR(1) process. εit are independent and identically distributed. Then, the
outcome variable Y Nit is an AR(1) process which is correlated with other units within its group.
Many outcome variables in practice may be correlated across units within groups, and may
also have unit roots (so we will allow Zg(i)t to have a unit root). For example, the outcome variable
in Abadie et al. (2010) is aggregate state-level cigarette consumption per capita. It would be
reasonable to expect variation in the observed dependent variable which affects certain regions
(such as the Northeast) but not others (such as the Southwest), but the linear factor model requires
all units to be affected in the same proportion, through θt.
Although the model may seem overly simplistic, Kaul et al. (2016) note that including pre-
treatment outcomes at each period as predictors in the selection of synthetic weights (which we
do) implies any other covariates (observed independent variables, for example) contribute nothing




to the selection of weights but may still impact counterfactual prediction. Despite this fact, Kaul
et al. (2016) notes many researches have done this in practice. In our model, there are no other ob-
served covariates which could impact counterfactual prediction, so we are in some sense operating
in an “easier” scenario. Adding observed covariates would likely only magnify our results.
As a result of the correlation within groups, one intuitively expects the SCM to choose higher
weights for units in the same group. Additionally, the synthetic control of unit imay fit the realized
outcome of unit i during the posttreatment period better if more units exist in its group. If this is
true, units in small groups may also be more likely to exhibit a high MSPE ratio—which could
complicate the inferential procedure. If the treated unit is in a small group (relative to other units),
it may appear to have a high MSPE ratio even if the treatment effect is zero.
We now explore these concerns with simulations of the following parameterization:
• Zg(i)t = βZg(i)t−1 + ug(i)t where ug(i)t ∼ N(0, 1) is iid across g and t.
• εit ∼ N(0, 1) is iid across i and t.
• T = 16, T0 = 8, and αit = 0 ∀i, t.
Figure 3.1 displays an example realization of Yit with all units on the same plot, and Figure 3.2
displays the same realization with units grouped according to g(i). In this example the treated unit
has one other unit in its group, J = 51, β = 1, and all other groups are of size 10. Note how it is
difficult to see simply from Figure 3.1 whether there is any clustering, let alone which units are in
which cluster. More importantly, it is difficult to infer how many control units the treated unit has
in its group.4
We now consider the difference between simulated and nominal rejection probabilities for
many different variations of the above parameterization. For the estimation of weights, we use
each pretreatment period outcome, so
X1 = (Y11, Y12, . . . , Y1T0) and V is the identity matrix IJ . We use an R implementation of the
SCM provided by Abadie et al. (2011). We reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect if the
“treated” unit’s MSPE ratio is the fifth highest (or higher), so the exact nominal rejection rates
depend on the number of units and range from 8.3% to 9.6%.. The number of control units outside
the treated unit’s group is 50 for each parameterization, but the number of control units within the
treated unit’s group varies from one to nine. β takes one of the values in {0.5, 0.7, 1}.
For each parameterization, we simulate 1000 independent panels. Figure 3.3 displays the re-
sults. The plots on the left display the difference in rejection proportions for the treated units,
while the plots on the right display the same for control units. There appears to be no strong strong
4Keep in mind only periods 1–8 should be used for this inference in practice because the treatment occurs in period
9.
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Figure 3.1: Example realization of Y (treated unit in bold)
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Figure 3.2: Example realization of Y (grouped; treated unit in group 0)
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Table 3.1: MSPE Statistics for Treated Unit Group Size = 2, Control Unit Group Size = 5
T = Treated, C = Control, 5/52 ≈ 9.6% nominal rejection rate
β = 1 β = 0 β = 0.5
T C T C T C
Proportion Rejected 0.084 0.104 0.085 0.093 0.083 0.106
Median MSPE Ratio 11.24 9.92 10.94 12.32 6.02 7.00
Median Pretreatment MSPE 0.428 0.292 0.316 0.230 0.378 0.265
Median Posttreatment MSPE 3.98 2.85 3.46 3.00 2.19 1.89
distortions except for the treated unit when its group size (2) is much less than that of the control
groups (10), but even in that case, inference based on the MSPE is conservative.
Although there do not appear to be substantial distortions in rejection probabilities, units in
smaller groups do tend to have worse fit (higher MSPE) both pre- and posttreatment. Table 3.1
displays some additional statistics for the parameterization with a treated unit group size of 2 and
a control unit group size of 5. For the three values of β considered, the treated unit has a higher
median MSPE both pre- and posttreatment than a control unit.
3.6 Selection of Analyses Based on Pretreatment MSPE of the
Treated Unit
In some cases the pretreatment MSPE of the treated unit is large relative to other units, so the
researcher may choose not to use the SCM (or not to report any results)—in other words, the
optimal weights W ∗ are presumed not to exist. Although Abadie et al. (2010) do not directly say
to do this, they write the following passage which could be misapplied:
So for each particular application, the analyst can decide if the characteristics of the
treated unit are sufficiently matched by the synthetic control. In some instances, the fit
may be poor and then we would not recommend using a synthetic control.
In Abadie et al.’s (2010) explanation, “characteristics” include several other covariates in addition
to pretreatment outcomes. However, if a researcher primarily (or only) considered pretreatment
fit of outcomes and would not report the statistical analysis if the fit was poor, then analyses
with low pretreatment MSPE are implicitly being selected for. Therefore, inference based on the
MSPE ratio, R1, is likely to be affected. Recall pretreatment MSPE of the treated unit is in the
denominator of R1, so an abnormally low pretreatment MSPE may imply an abnormally high R1
even in the absence of a non-zero treatment effect.5
5By “abnormally” low/high we mean relative to the distribution implied by the underlying DGP and application of
the SCM without any selection of analyses.
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Figure 3.3: Plots of Deviations from Nominal Rejection Rates
(a) Treated Units; Control Groups Size 5 (b) Control Units; Control Groups Size 5
(c) Treated Units; Control Groups Size 10 (d) Control Units; Control Groups Size 10
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Table 3.2: MSPE Statistics for Panels with “Good” Treated Unit Fit; Treated Unit Group Size = 2,
Control Unit Group Size = 5
T = Treated, C = Control, 5/52 ≈ 9.6% nominal rejection rate
β = 1 β = 0 β = 0.5
T C T C T C
Proportion Rejected 0.133 0.0978 0.123 0.0967 0.132 0.100
Median MSPE Ratio 22.97 9.67 22.28 12.86 12.00 7.10
Median Pretreatment MSPE 0.241 0.308 0.163 0.236 0.198 0.274
Median Posttreatment MSPE 4.20 2.74 3.41 3.12 2.18 1.96
For the same sets of 1000 panels in Section 3.5, we consider only those where the pretreatment
MSPE of the treated unit lies below the 75th percentile of all control units’ pretreatment MSPE;
there are around 600–700 such panels depending on the exact parameterization. Figure 3.4 and
Table 3.2 displays the results. As one might expect, rejection probabilities for the treated unit are
now significantly higher than nominal rates, while those of the control units are close to nominal.
The intuition here is that researchers may conclude the SCM is performing well based on the
goodness of fit of the treated unit during the pretreatment periods (relative to control units), but
this fact may also correspond to a higher MSPE ratio (relative to control units) even without a
treatment effect. The 75th percentile is not a particularly aggressive cutoff, either; more aggressive
requirements for pretreatment fit will exacerbate the problem. The simple solution is, as Abadie
et al. (2010) suggest, to consider how close other covariates are to their synthetic counterparts
instead of only the pretreatment MSPE of the treated unit.
3.7 Discussion
In this paper, we have shown that if outcome variables of units are correlated within groups, the
SCM can have varying performance across group sizes. In particular, if the treated unit of interest
belongs to a small group (relative to other units’ group sizes), then the fit of the synthetic control
to the realized outcome will be poorer for the treated unit both pre- and posttreatment. This could
cause problems in interpretation of SCM performance if the researcher does not observe group
structure. However, we do not see substantial distortions in inference using the MSPE ratio, and
in fact, small groups may have relatively conservative rejection probabilities. Ferman and Pinto
(2017) make progress in theoretical evaluation of these claims by showing non-stationary common
factors can lead to asymptotic bias, although they use a slightly different DGP.
Our second contribution is a word of warning that applying the SCM only in situations where
the unit of interest has “good” pretreatment fit may complicate inference based on the MSPE ratio,
if pretreatment outcomes at each period are used as predictors (in X) in the selection of synthetic
46
Figure 3.4: Plots of Deviations from Nominal Rejection Rates (for Panels with “Good” Treated
Unit Fit)
(a) Treated Units; Control Groups Size 5 (b) Control Units; Control Groups Size 5
(c) Treated Units; Control Groups Size 10 (d) Control Units; Control Groups Size 10
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weights. It is important to note the inferential results described by Firpo and Possebom (2016) are
not contradictory to what we show here; in our case, Assumption 2 of Firpo and Possebom (2016)
is violated because the labeling of the treated unit is no longer random. Kaul et al. (2016) shows
that even when other covariates (which are meaningful for counterfactual prediction) are included
as predictors, the SCM will select weights such that only the pretreatment outcomes matter. So
including other covariates does not solve our problem. As Kaul et al. (2016) propose, one should
include only the mean or at most one pretreatment realization of the outcome variable. And given
our results, one should not throw away analyses based solely on the pretreatment MSPE of the
treated unit if the post/pretreatment MSPE ratio is to be used for inference.
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APPENDIX A
Additional Statistics and Empirical Results
A.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample
Except for the dates projects are active, the descriptive statistics for the full sample are substantially
similar to the subset used for the empirical analysis.
Table A.1: (Full Sample) Kickstarter projects descriptive statistics.
Variable Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev.
Duration (days) 1 30.00 84.00 32.09 10.48
Goal ($) 1 6000.00 100000000.00 31895.02 897252.41
Goal if successful ($) 1 5000.00 1500000.00 10550.05 27467.91
Pledged ($) 0 1568.00 13285226.36 11276.07 97238.34
Pledged if successful ($) 1 5766.22 13285226.36 22096.55 142277.29
Prop of goal achieved 0 0.41 15804.00 2.63 126.81
Prop of goal achieved if suc 1 1.16 15804.00 5.58 186.96
Backers 0 26.00 105857.00 138.09 856.73
Backers if successful 1 80.00 105857.00 270.21 1246.09
A.2 Poisson With Fixed Effects à la Kuppuswamy and Bayus
(2017)
For the subset of projects which last exactly 30 days, we estimate Poisson regression with project
fixed effects. The results presented in Table A.2 are similar to Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017)
which demonstrates the set of projects we use is substantially comparable to that of previous liter-
ature.
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Figure A.1: (Full Sample) Histograms of project features.
Figure A.2: (Full Sample) Histograms of the number of posts per project and number of comments
per project-day with a new post.
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Table A.2: Poisson regression of new backers on controls
(1) (2)
coef se coef se
0.2 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.4 0.316*** (0.0497) 0.134*** (0.0417)
0.4 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.6 0.582*** (0.0723) 0.366*** (0.0547)
0.6 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 0.8 0.781*** (0.0870) 0.591*** (0.0737)
0.8 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 < 1 1.000*** (0.104) 0.779*** (0.0827)
1 ≤ PropGoali,t−1 0.494*** (0.122) 0.193* (0.103)
t = 2 1.418*** (0.0713)
t = 3 1.082*** (0.0859)
t = 4 0.783*** (0.0700) 0.583*** (0.0592)
t = 5 0.671*** (0.0653) 0.526*** (0.0522)
t = 6 0.470*** (0.0439) 0.380*** (0.0360)
t = 7 0.372*** (0.0408) 0.316*** (0.0373)
t = T 1.411*** (0.0514) 1.436*** (0.0503)
t = T − 1 0.955*** (0.0473) 0.982*** (0.0430)
t = T − 2 0.529*** (0.0625) 0.559*** (0.0575)
t = T − 3 0.371*** (0.0677) 0.387*** (0.0613)
t = T − 4 0.242*** (0.0639) 0.261*** (0.0629)
t = T − 5 0.136*** (0.0467) 0.155*** (0.0462)
t = T − 6 0.116*** (0.0435) 0.137*** (0.0391)
Monday 0.222*** (0.0159) 0.212*** (0.0186)
Tuesday 0.235*** (0.0209) 0.229*** (0.0200)
Wednesday 0.246*** (0.0252) 0.226*** (0.0209)
Thursday 0.253*** (0.0277) 0.200*** (0.0220)
Friday 0.128*** (0.0232) 0.101*** (0.0236)
Saturday -0.0723*** (0.0180) -0.0698*** (0.0212)
NumOtherProjectsit -0.000189 (0.00170) -0.00120 (0.00181)
NumOtherNewbackersit 5.86e-06 (2.77e-05) -1.61e-05 (1.72e-05)
RedditPostst−1 > 0 0.357*** (0.0593)
RedditPostst−2 > 0 0.195*** (0.0386)
RedditPostst−3 > 0 0.168*** (0.0376)
Observations 306,646 279,666
Number of projects 10,574 10,358
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A.3: (Full Sample) Distribution of Reddit posts across projects’ funding cycles.
A.3 Estimation of the Probability of Success at t
In this section, we estimate the probability of success of a project based on the number of days
remaining and the proportion of the goal raised so far, ŝ(T − t, gt). For the subset of projects
which last exactly 30 days, we take a random day from each project as an observation. Then, we
perform a logistic regression with:
P[Successi|Xi] = (1 + exp(−α−Xiβ))−1
where Xi includes the funding proportion and days remaining as 2nd degree polynomials and the
interaction between the two. The results are presented in Table A.3.1 Figure A.4 illustrates the
predicted probabilities for a grid of values.
1Table created by the stargazer package.
Hlavac, Marek (2015). stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables. R package version 5.2.
http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=stargazer
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Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,468.370
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure A.4: Logistic prediction of probability of success
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